Existing work on the effects of electoral reforms suggests that decreasing the costs of voting may exacerbate rather than reduce representational biases in turnout. We argue that some electoral institutions may have more uniform mobilization effects than previously thought and exploit the sequential introduction of postal voting in Switzerland to analyze how an exogenous decrease in voting costs affects the political and socio-demographic composition of turnout in direct legislation. In contrast to previous studies we find that postal voting mobilizes equally along many dimensions including individuals' political knowledge, employment status, and religious denomination. Although it does mostly activate supporters of leftist and centrist parties, less politically interested individuals, and high earners, these changes have only limited effects on the overall turnout composition and are unlikely to affect referendum outcomes. Our results alleviate some of the concerns about the negative side effects of electoral reforms on political choice in large electorates.
Introduction
Only those who cast a ballot determine the outcome of an election. Yet virtually all democracies exhibit a degree of unequal political participation. The old, the more educated, and the wealthy have higher probabilities to vote than the young, the less educated, and the poor (Fujiwara 2015; Nevitte, Blais, Gidengril and Nadeau 2009; Leighley and Nagler 2007) .
This representational inequality may lead to biases in public policy because policymakers are most responsive to the needs of those who are politically active (Lijphart 1997; Butler 2014) .
Moreover, many worry that low turnout prepares the ground for affluent special interests covertly influencing the policymaking process, often to the detriment of the public good (Bolling 1986) . As a consequence, some expect that high levels of turnout would lead to decisive shifts in public policy, or, as President Obama puts it: "It would be transformative if everybody voted -that would counteract money more than anything."
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To increase political participation, scholars and pundits frequently advocate electoral reforms that reduce the costs of voting. Among the set of potential policy instruments, postal voting stands out as a particularly attractive way of facilitating participation of those who would abstain otherwise by offering citizens more flexibility in deciding when and where to vote. Yet electoral reforms that make it less costly to vote may also have negative effects in terms of both the efficiency and quality of electoral choice. First, to the extent that postal voting fails to alter election outcomes, lower turnout may actually be more economically efficient. Second, if postal voting mobilizes especially those with low levels of political knowledge, this could lead to qualitatively inferior, more volatile, and more extreme electoral choices, which, in turn, could reduce policy stability and the ability of democracies to pursue long-term policy goals.
Although postal voting seems increasingly popular among pundits and policymakers to counteract growing voter fatigue and representational inequality, the available evidence sug-gests that this reform fails to reduce biases in turnout. Instead, the most widely cited studies (Southwell and Burchett 1997; Southwell and Burchett 2001) find that in a 1996 special Senate election in the state of Oregon additional voters mobilized by the opportunity to vote by mail were more educated and better informed about politics. Berinsky, Burns and Traugott (2001) show that voting-by-mail is associated with a decrease in the long-term probability of voting among individuals that already have been non-voters in the past. Subsequent studies have examined whether postal voting mobilizes citizens with specific political ideologies in American presidential (Gomez, Hansford and Krause 2007) and congressional elections (Citrin, Schickler and Sides 2003) or increases the share of less educated individuals voting on ballot propositions (Hodler, Luechinger and Stutzer 2015; Fujiwara 2015) . The knowledge generated by these more recent studies still seems consistent with Berinsky's (2005) summary of earlier work which concludes that "[...] voting reforms do not correct the biases inherent in the electorate, and in some cases, reforms may even worsen these biases" (p.
482).
While these previous studies have generated important knowledge about the consequences of electoral reform in specific states and elections, we still lack evidence on how electoral institutions affect turnout in referendums in which citizens decide directly on specific policy proposals. This lack of knowledge is regrettable since the ability to vote directly over welldefined policy issues -as opposed to choosing between complex policy and valence bundles offered by parties or candidates -provides citizens with a particularly powerful instrument to shape public policy. Moreover, and abstracting away from replicability problems that seem to exist with some of the earlier findings (Gronke and Miller 2012) , previous work has neither examined in detail how changes in individuals' voting probabilities shift the sociodemographic and political composition of turnout when compared with the voting-eligible population, nor has it assessed whether electoral reform may be consequential for referendum outcomes. Although this more encompassing assessment of the effects of electoral reforms seems important, the estimations necessary for such a detailed analysis require data sets that are much larger than those employed by earlier work: They would have to cover longer time periods (in which citizens could possibly vote on hundreds of referendums) and a large set of individuals -a type of big data that was unavailable to previous studies.
We address these shortcomings by studying the long-term effects of postal voting on turnout in direct legislation in Switzerland (1981 Switzerland ( -2009 . In contrast to electoral reforms that explicitly condition on socio-demographic characteristics such as female suffrage or literacy tests, postal voting does not obviously imply differential effects that directly relate to characteristics such as an individual's gender, age, or religious orientation. Yet, postal voting may still have heterogeneous mobilization effects (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001) .
First, as previous studies have argued (Gomez, Hansford and Krause 2007; Tucker, Vedlitz and DeNardo 1986) , to the extent that individuals' propensities to vote correlate with their political and ideological preferences, even a non-discriminatory get-out-the-vote instrument such as postal voting can benefit specific parties or ideological platforms. Second, the availability of voting by mail may reduce the costs of voting more strongly for those with low levels of political interest as these individuals generally derive less utility from casting a ballot and therefore tend to abstain more frequently. Third, postal voting should increase turnout more strongly among high-income individuals because they face higher opportunity costs (arising from going to the voting both and potentially waiting to vote) than low earners. Finally, the option of voting by mail should increase political participation mostly among those with low and medium levels of education because political choices in referendums require evaluating and choosing between complex policy proposals. Since the costs of turning out comprise these evaluation and decisionmaking costs as well as the costs of going to the voting booth and waiting to vote, postal voting will be more likely to shift the net costs of voting below the critical threshold that will make even those with lower levels of education participate in referendums.
To evaluate these predictions, we exploit the sequential introduction of postal voting in Swiss cantons as a natural experiment and combine large individual-level and aggregate level data to provide unusually detailed insights into how the introduction of postal voting changes the composition of turnout in referendums. This allows us to estimate both its aggregate effect on turnout and, for the first time, decompose this effect into its sociodemographic and political individual-level fragments. Based on an analysis of all 239 Swiss referendums from 1981 to 2009 in combination with detailed survey data from over 79,000 individuals we subsequently simulate the consequences of postal voting on direct-democratic policy decisions.
We leverage large amounts of individual-level data to provide a more detailed picture of how postal voting affects the composition of turnout and compare these effects against the benchmark distribution of citizens in the population. Our estimates suggest that the positive effect of postal voting on turnout results from a largely equal increase in participation across ideological orientations, political knowledge, trust in government, employment status, religious denomination, as well as age and gender groups. However, we find that postal voting significantly increases participation of individuals with low levels of interest in politics, high earners, and citizens with low and medium levels of education.
While interesting, these estimates alone remain insufficient to fully assess the consequences of electoral reforms. As we document in the theory part, evaluating the effects of electoral reform requires a comparison with the benchmark distribution observable in the population of voting-eligible individuals. This is because, irrespective of whether the estimated marginal effects are large or small, they may improve or worsen biases in turnout depending on the benchmark composition and the pre-reform turnout propensities of different political and socio-demographic groups. Therefore, we not only decompose the turnout increase of postal voting, but also map in detail the composition of turnout with and without postal voting and compare this distribution with the composition of all eligible voters. In addition, we offer simulation results suggesting that postal voting does not lead to decisive shifts in referendum results.
This study makes theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions. First, we develop and evaluate theoretical arguments about how different subgroups of the electorate respond to the introduction of postal voting in referendums. Second, by analyzing the detailed shifts in the composition of turnout that result from the availability of postal voting for a large set of referendums, our results promise to shed light on whether an electoral reform can succeed in activating passive constituencies more generally (Nichter 2008) . Third, our findings inform the debate about the unintended consequences of electoral reforms in light of their likely policy consequences. We elaborate on these implications in the conclusion.
Cost Sensitivities, Turnout, and Postal Voting
Turnout constitutes an aggregate phenomenon that results from citizens' individual decisions to participate in an election, which, in turn, depends on the expected costs and benefits of voting (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) . A large literature has examined how changes in the costs of voting affects turnout using observational, field-experimental, as well as lab-experimental data (see Feddersen (2004) for a review). For example, turnout responds to factors such as bad weather (Tucker, Vedlitz and DeNardo 1986; Gomez, Hansford and Krause 2007; Fraga 2011) , natural disasters (Sinclair, Hall and Alvarez 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011; Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011) , the removal or relocation of polling stations (McNulty, Dowling and Ariotti 2009; Brady and McNulty 2011; Gibson, Bonggeun, Stillman and Boe-Gibson 2012) , the availability of electronic voting (Fujiwara 2015) and exit poll information (Morton, Muller, Page and Torgler 2015) , and compulsory voting laws (Jackman 1987; Panagopoulos 2008; Bechtel, Hangartner and Schmid 2015) . The theoretical models that underlie these empirical contributions typically follow Downs (1957) by assuming that citizens have homogeneous voting costs or, alternatively, by focusing on a representative actor characterized by a specific cost level as is the case in the first generation of formal voting models (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983) .
A growing literature has moved towards more realism by allowing individuals to have different voting costs (Ledyard 1984; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985; Levine and Palfrey 2007 ).
These models predict heterogeneous effects of cost shocks that depend on where an individual is located in the cost distribution. Although an individual's voting cost remains an ultimately unobservable characteristic, these models have an important, empirically observable implication: A change in the costs of voting may have distinct effects on different parts of the citizenry. The empirical literature supports this idea. For example, relocating polling stations reduces turnout most strongly among older individuals (Brady and McNulty 2011) .
Recently, Panagopoulos and Abrajano (2014) re-analyze the field-experimental data from Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) and conclude that social pressure is most effective in stimulating turnout among the elderly.
The most politically contentious effects of changes in the costs of voting arise because differential mobilization may have an important impact on electoral and policy outcomes. For example, Gomez, Hansford and Krause (2007) find that bad weather depresses turnout more strongly among those that identify with the Democrats. As a consequence, the Republican party receives more votes on rainy election days than it would have received if the weather had been nice. Depending on the partisan margin, this type of differential mobilization may have notable effects on the distribution of political power. In his study of compulsory voting in Australia, Fowler (2013) documents that making it mandatory to vote increases the Labor Party's vote shares by 7 to 10 percentage points and Fujiwara (2015) finds that the availability of electronic voting mainly mobilizes less educated individuals which, in turn, translates into higher health care spending. These studies suggest that the differential mobilization effects of electoral reforms may have substantial consequences for public policy choices.
Theoretically, and in contrast to, for example, the removal of literacy tests (Filer, Kenny and Morton 1993) , the introduction of female suffrage (Husted and Kenny 1997) , or the availability of electronic voting (Fujiwara 2015) , postal voting does not impose obvious differential costs that one would expect to vary across socio-demographic groups. In this sense, the availability of voting by mail constitutes an exogenous decrease in the costs of participating in elections as it merely offers citizens more freedom to decide when and where to vote. 
Postal Voting and Differential Mobilization
How can changes in the costs of voting affect election results? In an influential study of turnout in presidential elections, Gomez, Hansford and Krause (2007) argue that rainfall increases the Republican party's vote share because the set of potential voters consists of two subsets (Tucker, Vedlitz and DeNardo 1986) . The first set comprises citizens that almost always turn out ("likely voters") while the second set consists of individuals that have a much lower propensity to participate in political collective action ("less likely voters"). Since the later group comprises more Democrats, the Democratic party receives higher vote shares in elections with high turnout levels than in comparable low-turnout elections.
This logic may have the potential to generalize to other contexts and electoral institutions.
In the Swiss political system, for example, individuals with a lower propensity to vote tend Citizens not only differ with respect to their partisan and ideological preferences, but also in the attention paid to political matters which is a precondition for making informed decisions when voting on ballot propositions (Bowler and Donovan 2000; Magleby 1984) .
While some share a strong interest in politics, others remain largely inattentive. An individual's political interest tends to strongly predict civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) as it reduces the costs of collecting and processing information required for forming a consistent opinion on an issue (Zaller 1992) . Consequently, variation in individuals' political interest may give rise to different responses to the introduction of postal voting.
Individuals with low levels of political interest generally derive less utility from casting a ballot and therefore tend to abstain. Postal voting decreases the costs of casting a ballot which compensates for the lower utility these individuals derive from participating in a political activity because they pay little attention to political matters. This shifts the costs of voting below the critical value, and therefore, also individuals with less political interest participate. As a consequence, and in line with Hodler, Luechinger and Stutzer (2015) , we expect that the mobilizing effect of postal voting should be more pronounced among those with low levels of political interest:
Hypothesis 3 (Political Interest) The positive effect of postal voting on turnout is stronger among the less politically interested than among the politically interested.
Citizens generally seem poorly informed about political issues as they fail to correctly answer seemingly trivial questions about politics (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) and this finding seems to generalize to voting on ballot proposition (Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 2000) . Yet, some individuals possess relatively less political knowledge than others and this affects their costs of civic engagement (Galston 2001) . The less knowledgeable find it more difficult to form a consistent opinion on an issueand lack the resources necessary to draw on elite cues (Zaller 1992 ) that they could use to compensate for the unavailability of encyclopedic information (Lupia 1992) . Therefore, one would expect that the less knowledgeable benefit more from the availability of postal voting than those with higher levels of political knowledge because the later group already has a relatively high propensity to vote.
Hypothesis 4 (Political Knowledge) The positive effect of postal voting on turnout is stronger among the less politically knowledgeable than among those with more political knowledge.
Another characteristic that could affect how individuals react to the availability of postal voting is one's level of education. Typically, education is viewed as a resource that provides information about "the ability to bear the costs of different types of participation" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 2000, 254) . The more educated possess cognitive skills and knowledge that facilitate opinion formation and thereby reduce the costs of political choice (Nevitte et al. 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995 ). This appears particularly important in our context because political choices in referendums require evaluating and choosing between complex policy proposals. Since the costs of turning out comprise these evaluation and decisionmaking costs as well as the costs of going to the voting booth and waiting to vote, postal voting should have particularly strong effects on those with lower levels of formal education.
Hypothesis 5 (Education) The positive effect of postal voting on turnout is stronger among those with low/medium levels of income than among those with high levels of education.
Finally, heterogeneity in the effect of postal voting may originate from individual differences in income levels. Typically, low earners have a lower propensity to vote because they are more concerned about securing an income that allows them to meet their own basic needs and those of their families than about participating in political decisionmaking processes (Nevitte et al. 2009 ). At first glance, this would suggest that reducing the costs of voting by introducing postal voting has the potential to increase participation among those with low income more strongly than among high earners. Yet an opportunity cost perspective leads to a different theoretical expectation: High-income individuals face higher opportunity costs that arise from going to the polling station and waiting to vote than low earners. This argument predicts that postal voting should have a stronger mobilization effect among those with higher income levels. points. This differential total effect -despite a homogeneous treatment effect -underscores the importance of estimating the impact of policy instruments that aim to increase political participation on the composition of turnout even if the mobilization effects themselves are homogeneous across subsets of the population. Otherwise, it will not be possible to fully gauge the impact of electoral reforms on representational inequality and public policy.
In the following we explore these predictions using individual and aggregate level data from Switzerland. We exploit the sequential introduction of postal voting to estimate the total mobilization effect of postal voting (i), explore the heterogeneity of the effect of postal voting by socio-demographic and political subgroups, compute the impact of the estimated effects on the composition of turnout (iii), and provide point predictions for referendum outcomes to gauge the policy relevance of postal voting in the context of direct legislation.
Background and Data Institutional Context: Direct Democracy in Switzerland
The Swiss political system offers several direct-democratic instruments that can be classified into two types. The first type offers the possibility of preventing policies that change the status quo. This type comprises the mandatory and the optional referendum. All federal level constitutional amendments and international treaties (since 1977) have to be put to a mandatory referendum. Moreover, using the so called optional referendum, citizens can challenge all federal bills passed by the Swiss parliament and put them to a vote conditional on having met the signature requirements.
2 The second type of direct-democratic instruments consists of the popular initiative which allows citizens to initiate direct legislation, i.e.
to change the status quo.
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The use of direct democratic instruments has increased strongly in the past decades.
Between 1848 and 1949, the Swiss voted only on about 1 to 2 ballot propositions per year.
In the second half of the 20th century, this number increased to 7 proposals per year. In our sample period Table 2 in the Appendix). In the first phase, postal voting remained limited to citizens that were unable to vote in person by going to a polling station for health-related or important professional reasons (Luechinger, Rosinger and Stutzer 2007, 171) . including several referendums on the welfare state (1993, 2004, 2008), immigration (1988, 1996, 2000) , and the protection of gay rights ( 
The Mobilization Effect of Postal Voting
We first estimate the average mobilization effect of postal voting using a difference-indifferences design. We then break down this effect into its components. Before turning to our difference-in-differences estimates, we discuss the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption, a key identification assumption that underlies our research design.
Parallel Trends Assumption: Placebo Tests
We employ a generalized difference-in-differences design to estimate the average mobilization effect of postal voting. The credibility of this research design in identifying a causal effect relies on the parallel trends assumption. This assumption requires that turnout in the cantons that introduced postal voting would have evolved similarly to turnout in the cantons that had not (yet) introduce postal voting. Although this assumption can not be evaluated directly since it involves a counterfactual outcome that remains unobserved, we can assess its plausibility by exploring trends in turnout prior to the availability of postal voting. This placebo test is typically implemented by comparing trends in the outcome variable one period before the intervention. Since we have a much longer time series, we are able to assess the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption over a larger set of pre-treatment periods. This 5 The sample sizes vary between 670 and 6,042 respondents per referendum day.
enables us to more closely examine the long-term stability of trends in treated and untreated units. In addition to this non-parametric approach, we estimate the placebo effects using a linear regression model that includes canton and year fixed effects. These results (reported in detail in Appendix Table A .1) suggest that the placebo effects were zero and, if anything, slightly negative prior to the electoral reform. Overall, these results suggest that the assumption of parallel trends seems plausible in our application.
Estimating the Mobilization Effect
We now estimate the mobilization effect of postal voting. We employ linear probability models since we are only interested in marginal effects at this point and cluster standard errors by referendum day. The results remain unchanged when estimated using our individual-level data in combination with a probit model (see Appendix Table A .2). As can be seen from
Model 1 in Table 1 , turnout in referendums increases by 5 percentage points on average. The effect is precisely estimated with a standard error of .01, which equals a t-value of 5. Models 
Decomposing the Mobilization Effect of Postal Voting
Although postal voting significantly increases citizen participation in referendums, we still have to explore whether it mobilizes equally or unequally across political and socio-demographic subgroups of the population and how this translates into changes in the exact composition of turnout. Addressing this question is important because many studies have documented that electoral choice correlates significantly with socio-demographic and political characteristics (Nevitte et al. 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) . To explore whether this correlation is also present in our data, we model an individual's vote over each referendum proposal as a function of political (political interest, party identification, ideological orientation, trust in government) and socio-demographic (age, education, employment, gender, religious denomination, place of residence language) variables. One of the potential, negative side effects of postal voting is that it may mostly activate constituencies with low political interest and less political knowledge which may affect the quality of electoral choice. As Figure 2 shows, when estimating the turnout effect of postal voting on those who report to be interested in politics, we find a small and significant effect of about 3 percentage points. For the politically less interested, however, we estimate the effect at 8 percentage points. This supports the expectation that postal voting more strongly activates individuals with low levels of political interest (Hypothesis 3). One may worry that this could also mean that postal voting more strongly mobilizes individuals who are less informed about political issues, which may adversely affect the quality of electoral choice.
Alternatively, even if individuals describe themselves as having little interest in politics, they may nevertheless be informed about the content and implications of ballot propositions.
To explore this question we directly measure political knowledge using two quiz items.
The first question asks respondents to name the title of each proposal. The second question asks respondents to roughly describe the content of each proposal. We code respondents as knowledgeable if they answer both questions correctly. When estimating the turnout impact of postal voting by levels of political knowledge, we find an almost identical effect of 6 percentage points for both, those with low and those with high knowledge. This seems inconsistent with the argument that electoral institutions aiming to increase civic engagement most strongly activate citizens whose lack of political knowledge could adversely affect the quality of democratic choice. We also find significant and largely uniform effects when exploring the effect of postal voting on the composition of turnout in terms of individuals' trust in government (6 percentage points), across different age groups (5 percentage points), employment status (4 to 6 percentage points), religious denomination (4 to 7 percentage points), and place of residence (5 percentage points).
In terms of respondents' levels of formal education, we find that postal voting more strongly mobilizes citizens with low (5 percentage points) and medium levels of education (7 percentage points). Yet, we cannot reject the null that the estimates for those with low and high education are equal (Hypothesis 5). This, again, suggests that postal voting may not cause a turnout composition that contains a higher share of individuals less capable of making reasonable political decisions. We also explore how postal voting affects turnout among different income groups. We find that postal voting significantly increases participation among all income groups, although the effect sizes differ. Turnout under postal voting comprises about 6 percentage points more low earners and 5 percentage points more individuals with medium incomes. Among high earners, however, this effect more than doubles (13 percentage points). This suggests that, although postal voting significantly increases civic engagement among all income groups, it has the most pronounced impact on those with high incomes, which is consistent with the opportunity cost argument (Hypothesis 6).
The finding that postal voting mobilizes both less interested individuals and high earners may seem counterintuitive because one would expect these two groups to be almost mutually exclusive. The empirics, however do not support this assumption. Although the two variables correlate, we find that even in the highest income category about 26% describe themselves as not being very interested in politics while for those in the lowest income category this figure is 41%.
Mapping the Composition of Turnout
The results above provide information about the heterogeneity in the mobilization effect of To what extent to we find the same degree of stability in the composition of turnout when examining voters' ideological orientations? Our results suggest that in the population of eligible voters there exist 20% leftist individuals, 63% place themselves in the center of the ideological left-right dimension, and 17% are located on the right of the ideological spectrum.
Party identification
Our results indicate that turnout with and without postal voting quite closely mirrors this distribution. Thus, despite the significant and substantial turnout increase documented above, we find that postal voting leaves the ideological composition of turnout virtually unchanged.
Although we find only moderate differential effects on the political composition of turnout, higher turnout could still come at the cost of increasing the share of voters with low levels of political interest and knowledge, which may adversely affect the quality of direct-democratic choice. Although our results suggest that the share of voters that are interested in political issues decreases from 84% to about 80%, this does not seem to imply that these voters are less knowledgeable. In fact, the share of politically knowledgeable voters stays virtually unchanged after the introduction of postal voting and continues to remain substantially higher than in the voting-eligible benchmark population (51%). This suggests that higher turnout does not necessarily imply that voters become less politically knowledgeable. Instead, the finding is consistent with a dynamic model of civic engagement in which citizens who decide to participate politically become more informed about the issues at stake, even if they remain less interested in politics in general. 
The Policy Consequences of Postal Voting

Conclusion
Voting is not a costless activity and these costs are felt differently across groups that hold different policy preferences and vary in their ability to engage in political decisionmaking.
How do changes in the costs of voting affect representational inequality and electoral choice?
While some deem higher levels of political participation normatively desirable to increase democratic legitimacy, others worry about whether turnout increases may negatively affect the quality of collective decisionmaking. We contribute to this debate by studying the introduction of postal voting as an electoral reform meant to foster political participation in direct legislation. By exploiting the sequential introduction of postal voting in Switzerland and analyzing large amounts of individual-level data we are the first to decompose the turnout increase due to postal voting into its political and socio-demographic components.
This enables us to map in detail how the composition of turnout responds to an exogenous decrease in the costs of voting in referendums.
We find that postal voting increases turnout by five percentage points on average, a magnitude that appears sizeable if compared to the effects of much more invasive get-outthe-vote measures. For example, in a field experiment on turnout, intimidating mailings that listed the voting records of one's neighbors and threatened "to publicize who does and does not vote...to apply maximal social pressure" (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008, 38) These results offer implications for policymakers and suggest avenues for future research.
First, since we find that the availability of voting by mail does not affect referendum outcomes, our results lessen concerns about the adverse consequences of postal voting on the quality of political choice. This is consistent with the finding that postal voting does not significantly increase the share of individuals with less political knowledge. Instead, we document that postal voting has significant and largely uniform effects on turnout among a large set of constituencies. Consequently, policymakers interested in increasing civic engagement across various sociodemographic, religious, and language groups may find postal voting a particularly attractive instrument. Second, we have examined the effect of a specific electoral institution that decreases the costs of voting on the detailed composition of turnout.
To what extent do our results generalize to other types of institutions that affect individuals' voting costs? The cumulative evidence begins to suggest a notable degree of heterogeneity in how individuals respond to electoral reforms. These effects depend on the design of the modified institutions in terms of their specificity (e.g., poll taxes that disproportionately hurt the poor) and seem to be conditional on whether they alter the costs of voting (e.g., relocation of polling places, literacy tests) or the costs of non-voting (e.g., fining or socially shaming non-voters). The literature would benefit from a systematic study of how the design of electoral institutions along those two dimensions affects the composition of turnout and, in turn, public policy. Finally, given the large set of electoral reforms available to policymakers, future work may start exploring how the implementation of a sequence of reforms affects electoral behavior. For example, even if the effects of one single change in the costs of voting may remain modest, combining several institutional changes over time could have a profound impact on elections and public policy. Studying how sequences of electoral reforms affect political choice and the extent to which institutional changes interact seems a promising and interesting task for future research. 
